The Political Response to Black Insurgency: A Critical Test of Competing Theories of the State

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Although empirical studies have concluded that political leaders in democratic systems often respond to mass unrest by expanding the welfare state, most of this research fails to explain adequately why the state responds as it does. I test the validity of pluralist and social control theories of state response by examining black insurgency in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Using pooled time-series analysis, I estimate the relationship between state AFDC recipient rates, state incarceration rates, and black political violence, testing a series of specific hypotheses that distinguish between these two competing theories. The results lend much support to the social control characterization of state response and may help explain trends in welfare and criminal justice policies over the last two decades.

There has been considerable debate among social scientists concerning the role of violent protest in the politics and policies of modern democracies. Much of the discussion centers on the consequences of mass violence and, in particular, whether the state responds by providing benefits to the insurgent group. Contrary to classic pluralist accounts of group influence and public policymaking in modern democracies, most empirical work concludes that mass political violence often results in a favorable response from the state, usually in the form of welfare state expansion. This research includes studies of state response to unrest among the unemployed and labor during the Great Depression (e.g., Goldfield 1989; Jenkins and Brents 1989; Piven and Cloward 1971, 1977), to black violence during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Fording 1997; Hicks and Swank 1983; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Piven and Cloward 1971), and to labor insurgency in Western Europe (Swank 1983).

Despite the evidence of a relationship between mass insurgency and welfare state expansion, there is little information about the process by which this occurs or the state’s motivation. A favorable response to unrest by the state might plausibly result from one of two processes. On the one hand, the state may respond favorably as a strategy to control unrest. For example, transfer payments might be increased to pacify the insurgents, thus resulting in demobilization and cessation of violence. This is often labeled the social control perspective and has been put forth by neomarxists to explain the development and evolution of the welfare state as well as the survival of capitalism (e.g., Offe 1974; Poulantzas 1973).

On the other hand, a somewhat modified form of pluralist theory views collective violence as a strategy employed by otherwise powerless groups to achieve access to the policymaking agenda. Presumably, they gain sympathy and support through increased visibility and then can effectively compete and bargain with other interests to obtain policy changes favorable to their interests (e.g., Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976; Lipsky 1970).

The two models describe very different processes by which social and political change occur. More important, perhaps, they suggest vastly different roles for the state in policymaking and depict contrasting power relationships between aggrieved groups and policymakers. The purpose of this research is to determine which of these processes most accurately characterizes the response to insurgency in the United States.

First, I specify more fully the alternative theories of state response and explain why the literature does not distinguish between them. Next, I develop a series of hypotheses that seek to determine which of the theoretical models is most accurate. I then present the results of an empirical analysis that distinguishes between these competing explanations by estimating the relationship among state rates for recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), state incarceration rates, and black political violence.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF STATE RESPONSE TO INSURGENCY

The Social Control Perspective

A key insight of social control theory is that influence may be exerted in one of two general ways. First, behavior may be controlled by threats of negative sanctions in the event of noncompliance. Some theories refer to this as coercive control. Alternatively, influence may be exerted by offering incentives or rewards in exchange for compliance, which is often labeled beneficial control. In the context of mass insurgency, the social control perspective posits that the state, acting in the long-term interest of elites, will seek to minimize the effect of insurgency by increasing the level of social control, whether it be coercive, beneficial, or some combination of the two.

Although the most visible form of control is coercive, many theorists suggest that the state is not likely to rely

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1 “Social control” is used across several fields in the social sciences. My use of the term most closely resembles that emerging from the conflict perspective, the theoretical origins of which can be traced to Marx. See Liska (1997) for a review of this literature.
upon it exclusively in managing insurgency. One of the most controversial applications of this theory is put forth by Piven and Cloward (1971). Consistent with more general arguments of some neomarxists (e.g., Offe 1975; Poulantzas 1973), Piven and Cloward argue that an important means by which the state maintains political stability, and thus preserves capitalism, is through periodic expansion of the welfare state. More specifically, during periods of mass insurgency, the state expands the relief rolls. This serves the dual function of addressing the grievances of the poor and restoring legitimacy to the incumbent government. When disorder subsides, the state slowly contracts the welfare rolls to keep labor markets competitive. This historical dynamic, they argue, was manifested most recently by the “relief explosion” that began during the late 1960s. Piven and Cloward claim that it was due in large part to the threat posed by widespread black violence that started with a wave of riots in 1964, followed by the insurgency of the (mostly black) poor throughout the remainder of the decade.

The role of beneficent control in quelling insurrection is clear enough, but social control theories are often rather vague about the role of coercive control, or repression. Most scholars who address this subject suggest that the state will respond to social unrest by an increase in both beneficient and coercive controls. Piven and Cloward (1971) perceive a mixed strategy, even in the absence of democratic political institutions, in their historical account of European relief systems during the sixteenth century. Since “penalties alone” were not adequate to maintain order, “some localities began to augment punishment with provisions for the relief of the vagrant poor” (p. 8).

In developing a more general model of social control, Quinney (1974) explicitly recognizes the role of both coercive and social welfare bureaucracies in the control of threatening classes. When this model is extended to the case of black insurgency, it suggests that the response may be an expansion of welfare coupled with an increase in coercive control, as reflected by more punitive criminal justice policies. This process is represented graphically in Figure 1.

The Neopluralist Perspective

At the heart of the classic pluralist interpretation of democratic politics are three assumptions. First, the means by which groups may communicate preferences to leaders are effective and accessible to all groups should they wish to use them. Second, sufficient competition among all groups exists so that no single group has a policymaking monopoly. Third, policymakers are open to demands put forth by any group that gains access to the policy arena (e.g., Dahl 1961).

An important corollary of this model with respect to social movements is that the use of unconventional political tactics is thus unnecessary and even pathological. The plausibility of this conclusion, as well as the adequacy of the classic pluralist model more generally, is perhaps most clearly questioned by the emergence and success of the civil rights movement in the United States, which effectively challenged the pluralist assumption that available (legal) means of political participation are available to all groups. This case led to new approaches to explain the use of unconventional political strategies and the rise of social movements. Modifications of the pluralist model concerning the origins of protest have become known as the resource mobilization and political process approaches to the study of social movements (e.g., Jenkins 1985; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Tilly 1978). According to these neopluralist models, the infrequent and often unexpected occurrence of insurgency is due
to insufficient resources and opportunities for successful mobilization, which counters the classic pluralist position that insurgency is unnecessary.

The success of the civil rights movement in achieving its goals also led to a revision of the pluralist model regarding the consequences of protest. By the late 1960s, a number of modifications attempted to account for the rationality and effectiveness of unconventional politics but retained many of the model's core assumptions. Among the earliest and most influential of these was Lipsky's (1970) study of protest by the poor in New York. Consistent with neopluralist critiques, Lipsky saw the problem of powerless groups to be a lack of bargaining resources. The role of protest is to "activate third parties to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to the protesters" (p. 2). The key to reaching these third parties, which Lipsky called "reference publics," is the mass media. Backed by the financial and organizational resources of reference publics, powerless groups may then be able to influence policy.

The role of protest, and more specifically that of political violence, has been incorporated into broader theoretical models of policymaking, which is clearly seen in the literature on agenda setting. Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976) identify several stages of the agenda-building process, along with characteristics of policies and groups that lead to different strategies for achieving access to the formal agenda. One particular strategy of agenda building is likely, they argue, when the relevant group originates from outside the government structure. In their outside initiative model, access to the formal agenda is achieved indirectly through issue expansion and eventual inclusion on the public agenda. At that point, access to the formal agenda is relatively easy, due to the interest aroused in a larger number of voters, and policymakers are likely to be inclined to act. The most critical stage for groups pursuing this strategy is issue expansion: "In order to be successful in getting on the formal agenda, outside groups need to create sufficient pressure or interest to attract the attention of decision makers" (p. 128). A common tactic, particularly among groups that are large in number but have few financial resources, is through "violence and threats of violence" (p. 131).2

Similar attempts to specify the potential outcomes of insurgency abound in the more recent literature on social movements. Generally speaking, these theories predict that insurgency may or may not be successful, depending upon a number of movement characteristics and/or environmental factors. Like Lipsky (1970) and Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976), many of these scholars cite the importance of third-party support (e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982). Other works cite such factors as the "strength" of insurgent forces (Tilly 1978), the nature of movement goals (e.g., Gamson 1975), and the ability of insurgent groups to combine violence with conventional modes of participation (Gamson 1975).

Despite differences, all these approaches share important features. First, the use of violence by aggrieved groups is assumed to be due to their inability to influence policymaking through conventional forms of participation. Second, success is thought to be contingent upon the nature of the political environment, most notably the level of public support for the insurgent group. Finally, and most important, although each of these models differs with the classic pluralist model regarding the utility of insurgency, all agree with it that the role of the state is to mediate among competing interests. In other words, although protest may be necessary for aggrieved groups to obtain access to the policy arena and the resources to compete effectively, once they reach the arena, the policymaking process is still a pluralist one. In the case of black insurgency, the specific implications are that any success in achieving issue expansion, gaining agenda access, and obtaining sufficient bargaining resources should have resulted in a favorable state response in one or more of the policy areas with which the insurgents were most concerned.

Black violence can be linked to a host of grievances, but two categories dominated the responses of insurgents to surveys conducted in the aftermath of major riots in 1967 (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). These were impoverishment in urban ghettos, including poor housing and unemployment, and harsh treatment by the criminal justice system. These concerns also were emphasized by protest leaders in negotiations with white officials after many riots and were reflected in press coverage of the events. Thus, to the extent that insurgency was successful, neopluralist theory predicts that it should have resulted in an expansion of the welfare state and a less punitive criminal justice system. This model is displayed in Figure 2.

### Distinguishing between Models of Response

Despite the extensive empirical literature on the response to insurgency, work thus far has not distinguished between the models described above. This is due to the fact that the vast majority of these studies have only examined the relationship between black insurgency and welfare expansion. Most find that a relationship exists, but both the social control and the neopluralist theories predict such a relationship. Inherently, then, studies that examine a beneficent response alone cannot distinguish between the two models.

This problem does not exist with respect to research that examines the relationship between insurgency and criminal justice policy. Indeed, as can be seen by comparing figures 1 and 2, the competing theories suggest an opposite relationship between insurgency and criminal punitiveness. Very little research falls in this category, however. Welch (1975) examined city-level responses to riots across several local expenditure categories. Based on a sample of all cities with more than 50,000 in population, she found the number of riots to be positively related to expenditures for police and fire protection but unrelated to expenditures for public welfare. The only research on the federal response to insurgency is by Button (1978), who exam-

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2 Similar models can be found in Cobb and Elder (1983) and especially in Baumgartner and Jones (1993), who specifically address the role of the 1960s riots in moving urban issues to the public agenda.
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FIGURE 2. The Neopluralist Model of State Response to Insurgency

I. Sympathy for insurgent group

II. Access to Policy Agenda

MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORTING GROUPS

POLICY ARENA

III. Compromise among competing interests

WELFARE GENEROSITY

CRIMINAL PUNITIVENESS

IV. Lasting reform

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I. Sympathy for insurgent group

MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORTING GROUPS

In an effort to distinguish between the two models, I employ several modifications to the studies described above. Although I analyze the response to insurgency with respect to both welfare and criminal justice policy, I examine responses at the state rather than the city level. States are the most important actors in the American federal system, at least with respect to these two policy areas. States are generally responsible for about half the welfare expenditures in the country. In the case of criminal justice, most arrests are made by local law enforcement agencies, but criminal courts are under state control, and nearly all convicted offenders are sent to state prisons. In addition, annual data for all states are available for nearly all the variables in this study, which is not the case at the city or county level. This permits a pooled cross-section time-series design, which has important inferential advantages over the designs used in previous studies. The period 1962–80 was chosen to include the entire span of black insurgency and yields an N of 912 cases.

Even with these modifications, it is possible that the findings across both types of response will be inconclusive. Consider the following. If a positive relationship were found between insurgency and welfare generosity, as empirical evidence leads us to believe, this would leave us with three possibilities. First, there might also be a positive relationship between insurgency and coercive control (criminal punitiveness), which would support the social control model. Second, there might be a negative relationship between insurgency and criminal punitiveness, which would be consistent with the neopluralist model, as it suggests that blacks were successful with respect to grievances in both policy areas. Third, despite a positive relationship between insurgency and welfare generosity, if insurgency and criminal punitiveness are unrelated,
we would still be unable to distinguish between the two theories. This third combination of findings would be consistent with a social control response and might be expected when elites fear the electoral costs of coercion are too great. Yet, this situation also would be consistent with a neopluralist model, as the lack of a coercive response could be interpreted as a victory for insurgent blacks.

In the third combination of relationships we would be able to distinguish between the two models by examining two additional hypotheses. The first rests on assumptions of the two models regarding the relationship between welfare and criminal justice policy. According to the social control model, both policies perform the same function, that is, social control. Assuming cost constraints and a fixed demand for social control, we should expect investment in these two areas to be negatively and reciprocally related (Invararity and Grattet 1989; Liska 1997; Spitzer 1975). In other words, there should be a trade-off between welfare and criminal justice expenditures as policymakers seek to maintain a desired level of social control at the lowest possible cost. In the neopluralist model, however, such a relationship should not exist. Policymakers are expected to approach each policy area separately, responding only to the preferences and resources of the groups in the arena. These alternative relationships are represented in figures 1 and 2.

The second distinguishing hypothesis concerns the expected duration of the various responses to insurgency. According to the neopluralist perspective, a favorable state response represents an exercise of power by the insurgent group in the bargaining arena, and therefore policy changes can be seen as genuine reform. If so, we should expect these changes to be relatively permanent, ceteris paribus. To use the language of Tilly (1978), the successful insurgent group, once a challenger from outside the polity, now becomes a member of the polity and henceforth has more or less direct access to the policy agenda. If the neopluralist model is correct, increases in welfare and decreases in criminal justice punitiveness should continue beyond the period of insurgency. In contrast, the social control model assumes that response to insurgency is driven by the need to reestablish order at the lowest possible cost. We should expect the state to reduce the overall level of social control investment once disorder subsides. Piven and Cloward (1971, 3) conclude with respect to a welfare response: “As turbulence subsides, the relief system contracts, expelling those who are needed to populate the labor market.” Similarly, to the extent that the state responds with coercive controls, we should expect decreased investment in this strategy once disorder subsides.

**AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF STATE RESPONSE TO BLACK INSURGENCY**

I rely on insurgency data originally reported in Fording (1997), where I defined insurgency as “any act of violence on behalf of blacks or minorities, either spontaneous or planned, which is either framed as or can be construed as politically motivated” (p. 11). The data cover collective acts of political violence (i.e., riots) as well as activities that involve fewer people, such as arson and sniping attacks, which were carried out by various black revolutionary groups. Violent acts are defined as rock throwing, vandalism, arson, looting, sniping, or beating of whites. Consistent with past research, insurgency is measured as the number of incidents. Data were collected for 923 events.

**A Model of State Welfare Generosity**

Consistent with past research, welfare generosity is measured as the annual growth (change) in the number of AFDC recipients per one million state population in each state. This measure, as opposed to benefit levels or expenditures, is chosen due to the emphasis given this dimension of welfare policy by social control explanations (Piven and Cloward 1971). Although the social control approach does not preclude the possibility that insurgency may be related to AFDC benefit levels as well, Piven and Cloward argue that the effect on recipient rates should be strongest, since it is presumed that the primary source of insurgency, and thus the target of state control, is the unruly poor who are not currently receiving government aid.

Exogenous variables for this model are suggested in past research on AFDC growth and on the growth of social welfare programs generally. Broadly conceptualized, several of these approaches to explaining welfare policy comprise what Rochefort (1986) has termed the progressive perspective. Other explanations focus on changes in welfare programs originating at the federal level, the characteristics of state political institutions, and the extension and expansion of political rights for the poor.

**The Progressive Perspective.** Within this general approach, different theorists have stressed various factors, but all the explanations share the position that welfare policy is primarily driven by the benevolent motives of policymakers and the needs of poor. To the extent that at least some motivation is humanitarian, we should expect change in AFDC rolls to be related to the size of the needy population, as measured by the annual change in the number of female-headed households in poverty and by the annual change in the level of unemployment in a state (e.g., Fording 1997; Isaac and Kelly).

Theorists also have linked welfare expansion to increased capacity to afford social welfare and to the increase in social pathologies caused by urbanization (e.g., Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). To capture these effects, I include *Per Capita Income* and *Per Capita State Revenue* as measures of economic capacity (each measured as the annual change) as well as the annual change in the level of urbanization in a state (Urban-
Political Citizenship. Some theorists suggest that well-being, and a measure of liberalism constructed by Berry (measured as the change in ideology), which is presumed to influence the decisions of state policymakers (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993), is captured by Residency Requirements, a dichotomous variable that equals 1 in 1969 for states affected by the Court's decision, 0 for all other states and years. Both variables are expected to be positively related to AFDC growth.

State Political Institutions. Ideological differences between the major political parties as well as the level of competition between them are accounted for by Democratic Control, a variable measuring Democratic control of state government (e.g., Dye 1984; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993), and Interparty Competition, which measures the annual change in interparty competition (Key 1949). The ideology of state electorates (measured as the change in ideology), which is presumed to influence the decisions of state policymakers (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993), is captured by Ideology, a measure of liberalism constructed by Berry et al. (1998). Each of these variables is hypothesized to affect AFDC growth positively.

Political Citizenship. Some theorists suggest that welfare expansion is associated with periodic expansion of "citizenship," that is, the evolution and extension of social and political rights (e.g., Gronbjerg 1977). One of the most important periods in this regard was the period of this analysis. Because it reflects the degree to which the poor are underrepresented in the electorate, class bias (measured as the annual change) is expected to have a negative effect on AFDC expansion.

Second, important court decisions ended decades (in some cases) of extreme malapportionment and gave densely populated poorer districts more power, which may have contributed to welfare expansion. I include Reapportionment and model this process as an intervention, that is, the variable has a nonzero value only for the first year after the first significant reapportionment was implemented in a state. The variable is not dichotomous, however, because the intervention value represents the magnitude of malapportionment (alternatively, the extent of reapportionment) that existed previously. Reapportionment is expected to result in greater representation for the urban poor, so it is expected to be positively related to AFDC growth.

A Model of State Criminal Punitiveness

The criminal justice response to insurgency is hypothesized to be reflected by the change in incarceration rates and is measured as the annual change in the number of prisoners in state prisons per one million population. In addition to black insurgency, several other variables are hypothesized to influence growth in state incarceration rates.

Criminal Involvement. Many criminologists cite the stability of punishment thesis, that is, incarceration rates remain relatively stable over time and change in response to society's tolerance for crime, rather than in response to crime itself. Several studies have found crime to be an important determinant of incarceration rates (e.g., Carroll and Cornell 1985; Garofalo 1980), but others have found little if any relationship (e.g., Carrol and Doublt 1983; Joubert, Picou, and McIntosh 1981). Given these mixed findings, I include Crime, measured as the annual change in crime rates, which is expected to be positively related to incarceration.

Economic Characteristics. Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) argue that incarceration rises with unemployment due to the potential threat to the social order from the unemployed. The issue of threat aside, Cappel and Sykes (1991) point out that employment status...
is an important determinant of sentencing outcomes because it indicates the likelihood that the defendant will continue to commit crime. Based on both of these hypotheses, the annual change in a state's unemployment rate is included in the incarceration model. Unemployment is expected to be positively related to incarceration.

In similar vein, many researchers posit a direct relationship between level of poverty and incarceration (e.g., Taggart and Winn 1993). Consistent with the threat hypothesis for unemployment, states with a higher level of inequality might be subject to greater potential threat from the lower classes, which could result in a greater level of incarceration. As with unemployment, however, an alternative explanation can be given for a positive relationship between inequality and incarceration. Defendants with sufficient financial resources can purchase competent defense and can sustain numerous appeals upon conviction, which increases the probability that they will not be incarcerated for very long, if at all. Consistent with other studies, I include Poverty, measured as the annual change in state poverty rates, as a measure of inequality.9

Finally, as noted earlier, two indicators of a state's economic capacity, per capita state income and per capita state revenue, are included. The direction of their effect on incarceration is not entirely clear. On the one hand, wealthy states may be able to afford more prisons, so economic prosperity should be positively related to incarceration. On the other hand, for the same reasons we expect poverty to be positively related to incarceration, we might expect per capita state income and revenue to be negatively related to incarceration.

**State Political Institutions.** As with welfare policies, several features of state political institutions and ideology are hypothesized to affect state incarceration rates. Relatively liberal voters, Democratic control of state government, competitive party systems, reapportionment, and extensive political participation by the poor and blacks are all expected to contribute to more lenient sentencing and parole policies, more alternatives to imprisonment, and hence lower incarceration rates, ceteris paribus. Although political variables have not been incorporated into many studies of incarceration rates in the past, recent research finds that political forces are an important determinant (e.g., Taggart and Winn 1993).

**Military Mobilization Rates.** Many studies have noted a negative correlation between military participation rates and incarceration rates. This is not surprising, given a presumed indirect influence of military participation rates through some of the variables discussed above (e.g., unemployment and poverty). A direct relationship also may exist; Inverarity and Grattet (1989, 357) note the "legal folklore" that, during times of war, "judges commonly offer young miscreants a choice between jail and enlistment." In any case, a direct relationship is supported to some extent by empirical research that controls for some of the variables (but not all) through which military mobilization might influence incarceration indirectly (e.g., Cappell and Sykes 1991). Based on this possibility, I include Military, measured as the annual change in the number of individuals in the state in the armed forces (active duty).

### The Conditional Effect of Insurgency

The strength of the relationship between insurgency and welfare depends on two important contextual factors (Fording 1997). First, presumably due to electoral incentives of policymakers, a welfare response only occurs when the insurgent group achieves effective electoral access (defined as both voting right and electoral systems that are not malapportioned). Second, as suggested by Keech (1968), during periods of effective electoral access, the influence of insurgency on AFDC growth is strongest in states with a relatively small black population (presumably due to a low level of white resistance) and in states with a relatively large black population (presumably due to black electoral influence). In other words, the insurgency effect is curvilinear (U-shaped) over the black population range of values and is weakest in the middle range (Fording 1997, 21). Based on this finding, a similar interactive specification is applied to the welfare model in this research.10

With respect to insurgency and incarceration, two curvilinear interactions are possible in the context of black electoral access. In a neoplatrist model, a generally negative relationship would be expected between insurgency and incarceration across the range of black population size, as this is representative of a beneficient response. Consistent with the pattern of response found for AFDC, however, we would expect states in the middle range of black population size to show a relatively weak beneficient response, as blacks in these states simultaneously experience a relatively high level of white resistance and a low level of black electoral strength (Keech 1968). In a social control model, however, a generally positive relationship would be expected between insurgency and incarceration, as this is representative of a coercive response. Moreover, in this case the magnitude of the relationship should be strongest in the middle range, again due to the (presumed) combination of white resistance and weak black electoral influence.

For each dependent variable, the conditional relationship is incorporated by estimating a model in which insurgency is hypothesized to interact with black electoral access and the size of the black population. To capture the effect of black electoral access, I adopt a dichotomous measure from Fording (1997), which I label Power. It has a value of 1 for a state in which the following two conditions are satisfied for all years: (1) blacks have effective voting rights (based on implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in certain

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9 Although poverty rates are not perfect measures of income inequality, better measures (such as Gini coefficients) are not readily available for the period analyzed here. Recently, Langer (1999) computed state-level Gini coefficients beginning in 1976 and reports sufficient correlation with state poverty rates to provide some confidence that poverty rates are a reasonable surrogate (>-.70).

10 For a thorough derivation of this specification in the context of a welfare model, see Fording 1997, 25–6.
states), and (2) electoral districts are not malapportioned (for states in which more than 90% of blacks resided in heavily populated urban areas). Otherwise, its value is 0. This implicitly assumes that both dimensions of access are essential to black interests being translated through electoral mechanisms.

**Additional Hypotheses**

**The Welfare-Incarceration Tradeoff.** As discussed previously, a crucial distinguishing feature of the social control model is the welfare-incarceration tradeoff. Although the model seems to rest heavily on this hypothesis (e.g., Liska 1997; Spitzer 1975), few empirical studies have tested it. In what appears to be the only research of its kind, Inverarity and Grattet (1989) used time-series analysis at the national level to test for a tradeoff between incarceration rates and the number of AFDC recipients, but they found no relationship. Aggregation is a potential source of problems in their analysis, however, and they failed to use an estimation technique that explicitly allows for reciprocal causation. Both problems are avoided in the present research, which posits a direct contemporaneous relationship between AFDC and incarceration. If the social control model is correct, the tradeoff should lead to a negative relationship between the two.

**The Durability of Response.** Another distinguishing hypothesis necessitates modeling both the short- and long-term effects of insurgency. Here it is important to consider the way in which the dependent variables, AFDC and incarceration, as well as insurgency are measured. The dependent variables are measured as changes (first-differences), whereas insurgency is measured simply as the number of incidents of political violence. Therefore, if insurgency is found to have an effect on either dependent variable for a particular lag length, the effect is assumed to result in a permanent increase in the level of that variable; in the language of time-series analysis, an intercept change in the level of the dependent variable occurs. This is consistent with the notion of lasting reform posited by the neopluralist model but inconsistent with the social control model, which suggests that welfare and incarceration levels will decline once disorder subsides. In order to test both models simultaneously, it is necessary to include multiple lags of insurgency. According to social control theory, a significant positive effect (for either dependent variable) eventually will be followed by a negative effect as the state readjusts the level of assistance/incarceration necessary to achieve social control. To accomplish this, I examine the effect of insurgency for up to seven lags. Lag lengths for other variables are determined by theory or, when theory is ambiguous, empirically (t-values). The entire model to be estimated, along with hypothesized relationships for both the welfare model and the incarceration model, is presented in Figure 3.

**ESTIMATION AND RESULTS**

The framework for this analysis is a pooled cross-sectional time-series design. Due to the hypothesized reciprocal effect between AFDC and incarceration, I employ two-stage least-squares (2SLS) to generate coefficient estimates. To deal with likely violations of error assumptions, I follow Beck and Katz (1995), who recommend calculating standard errors (panel corrected standard errors, or PCSEs) that are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation. To handle serial correlation, they recommend a lagged dependent variable (LDV) rather than a traditional generalized least squares (GLS) correction. As they argue, the LDV approach explicitly brings the dynamics into the model and, based on Monte Carlo tests, appears to provide more efficient parameter estimates (compared to GLS) for typical pooled data sets. Thus, the final estimation strategy used here integrates 2SLS with PCSEs.11

To arrive at the final set of results, I engaged in three rounds of estimation. The first used an iterative process to determine the proper lags for the effect of insurgency, beginning with a strictly additive model that contained lags of up to seven years, and the lags that exhibited the strongest effects were retained.12 The second round introduced interaction terms for the insurgency variables, dropped any interactions that did not appear significant (based on joint F-tests) or theoretically plausible, and reestimated. These results are presented as model 1 in tables 1 and 2 for both AFDC and incarceration. Based on these results, the third round estimated a final parsimonious model, retaining all variables that exhibited both the correct sign and a t-value of at least 1.0 in absolute value. These final results are presented as model 2 in tables 1 and 2.

**Explaining State Welfare Generosity**

Many scholars refer to the late 1960s as the “relief explosion,” due to the innovation and expansion that occurred across a variety of public assistance programs, especially AFDC. What was responsible for this massive increase in welfare participation? The answer may be at least partially provided in Table 1, which displays regression results for AFDC. Consistent with my earlier analysis (Fording 1997), unemployment, residency requirements, and state ideology were all significant factors. In addition, urbanization and female poverty are positively related to AFDC growth. My earlier analysis failed to account for urbanization, and the significance of female poverty (which was insignificant earlier) is likely explained by the improved specification of the model.

The influence of insurgency on AFDC growth is strong and appears to be conditional upon electoral access and the size of the black population. This can be seen from examining the coefficients for the first set of insurgency variables in model 2 of Table 1 (i.e., where

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11 As Figure 2 indicates, the model is clearly overidentified, assuming the hypothesized relationships between the exogenous variables unique to each model and the endogenous variables do in fact exist. Identification is also significantly aided (at least for the AFDC model) by the inclusion of state dummy variables in the incarceration model.

12 It is possible to include all the interactive terms up to seven lags in one model, but it would be unwieldy and likely suffer crippling multicollinearity problems.
insurgency is lagged two years). As in my 1997 analysis, the effect of insurgency is near zero when blacks did not have electoral access. Once they achieved electoral power, however, the effect indeed appears to be strong and varies significantly across the black population range in a curvilinear manner. Using slope coefficient estimates from Table 1, and setting the contextual variables of power and black to the desired values, the effect of insurgency when access has been achieved can be estimated for the range of values of the black population observed throughout the 1962–80 period. These estimated effects, depicted graphically in Figure 4, generally reflect the curvilinear pattern reported in my earlier analysis (Fording 1997). At a two-year lag and in states where blacks comprise less than 3% of the population, each incident of insurgency is predicted to cause an increase in AFDC growth of 250–300 recipients per million population. When the black population is larger, the effect of insurgency diminishes, although not as significantly as my original results suggest. In states in which at least 30% of the population is black, each episode of insurgency is estimated to produce an increase in AFDC growth of at least 500 recipients per million population.

Explaining State Criminal Punitiveness

The results for the incarceration model are presented in Table 2, which reveals that the strongest effects originate from state economic conditions. Unemployment and poverty both exhibit relatively strong positive relationships with incarceration rates, whereas higher state revenue is associated with a reduction. As with welfare generosity, the influence of political variables is significant but not especially striking. Both Democratic control and interparty competition are negatively related to incarceration, which is consistent with hypotheses that liberal control of political institutions or competitive party systems in the state produces more liberal policies. The other political variables—ideology, reapportionment, and class bias—all proved insignificant.

The effect of insurgency on incarceration was estimated in the same manner as for AFDC, by an iterative procedure that isolated the potentially significant lags and then determined the significance of the various interactions. The results clearly demonstrated that the effect of insurgency is not conditional as hypothesized, so an additive specification was used to generate the final results presented in Table 2. This is not to say that insurgency is unrelated to incarceration, however, as can be seen by examining the coefficient value for the two-year lag of insurgency, which indicates a positive and significant relationship. According to the results, each act of insurgency is predicted to increase incarceration by about 23 prisoners (per million population), holding other variables constant.

These results have two important theoretical implications. First, they provide support for the social control theory of state response, in particular a model in which the state increases both coercive and beneficial types of controls when threatened. Second, the
### TABLE 1. Two-Stage Least-Squares Regression Results for AFDC Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Β</td>
<td>PCSE</td>
<td>Β</td>
<td>PCSE</td>
<td>β*</td>
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<td><strong>Progressive Perspective</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female poverty,,:t</td>
<td>471.97**</td>
<td>190.00</td>
<td>491.13**</td>
<td>181.45</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment,:t</td>
<td>861.96**</td>
<td>137.82</td>
<td>842.43**</td>
<td>138.87</td>
<td>.28</td>
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<td>Revenue,:t-1</td>
<td>-3,652.96</td>
<td>8,962.03</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income,:t-1</td>
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<td>1.29</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization,:t-1</td>
<td>193.30**</td>
<td>54.05</td>
<td>212.19**</td>
<td>56.41</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Federal Changes</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>-125.13</td>
<td>385.83</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residency requirement,:t</td>
<td>1,639.53*</td>
<td>831.89</td>
<td>1,863.59*</td>
<td>814.39</td>
<td>.09</td>
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<td><strong>State Institutions</strong></td>
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<td>Democratic control,:t</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interparty competition,:t-1</td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology,:t-1</td>
<td>44.93**</td>
<td>17.99</td>
<td>42.62*</td>
<td>18.90</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td><strong>Political Citizenship</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reapportionment,:t</td>
<td>42.93</td>
<td>109.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class bias,:t-3</td>
<td>-1,154.66</td>
<td>1,463.94</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insurgency: Lag of Two Years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-2</td>
<td>-45.16</td>
<td>240.40</td>
<td>-25.62</td>
<td>241.99</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power,:t</td>
<td>342.81</td>
<td>531.60</td>
<td>668.80</td>
<td>486.34</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-2 x Power,:t</td>
<td>352.93</td>
<td>266.53</td>
<td>321.16</td>
<td>267.49</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-2 x Power,:t x Black,:t</td>
<td>-20.92</td>
<td>14.68</td>
<td>-19.58</td>
<td>15.02</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-2 x Power,:t x Black,:t</td>
<td>.94**</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.89*</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.29/.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insurgency: Lag of Five Years</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-5</td>
<td>332.87</td>
<td>250.90</td>
<td>356.25</td>
<td>252.60</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power,:t-3</td>
<td>-1,042.09*</td>
<td>441.32</td>
<td>-1,200.81**</td>
<td>425.15</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-5 x Power,:t-3</td>
<td>-567.47*</td>
<td>278.18</td>
<td>-743.28**</td>
<td>294.04</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-5 x Power,:t-3 x Black,:t</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-5 x Power,:t-3 x Black,:t</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency,:t-5 x In(Black),:t</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>125.73</td>
<td>67.34</td>
<td>-.37/- .06</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare-Incarceration Tradeoff</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incarceration,:t</td>
<td>-1.14**</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-1.09**</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC,:t-1</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>750.51*</td>
<td>369.17</td>
<td>668.65*</td>
<td>321.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
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<td>912</td>
<td>912</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Column entries are unstandardized slope estimates (β), PCSEs, and for model 2, standardized slope estimates (β*). The standardized effects reported for insurgency are calculated by setting the variable Black (percentage black) at the values represented by the 25th and 75th percentiles (1.44% and 13.78%, respectively, based on the full sample). A joint F-test indicated that the inclusion of unit effects (i.e., state dummies) was not warranted. An LM (language modifier) test demonstrates that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable sufficiently eliminates serial correlation. All estimates were generated by RATS (regression analyses of time series) procedure written by Nathaniel Beck. Significance tests are two-tailed for insurgency variables, one-tailed for all other variables. *p < .05, **p < .01.

insignificance of insurgency for welfare generosity when blacks do not have electoral access suggests that, in the absence of electoral power, insurgency is likely to receive only a coercive response from the state.

**Additional Hypotheses**

Despite the initial support for the social control model, it is useful to examine hypotheses concerning other aspects of state response that help distinguish between the neopluralist and social control models. The first concerns the durability or permanency of the response. If the direct (positive) effect of insurgency on AFDC growth is relatively permanent, then the lasting reform posited by the neopluralist model is supported, and the findings concerning incarceration are contradicted. An additive model of AFDC growth was estimated with a series of insurgency variables lagged up to seven years.13 The values of the coefficients obtained from this regression display a relatively clear pattern over time. The initial response to insurgency is positive, with the first significant coefficient value seen at a lag of two years. Beyond this point, the coefficient value becomes negative, although only significantly so at a lag of five years, that is, three years after the initial positive response.14 A similar pattern can be observed

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13 Additive models were used in these diagnostic regressions because seven lags of interaction terms are extremely cumbersome, and the multicolinearity problem would be severe.
14 For the effect of insurgency on AFDC, the coefficient values for seven lags were -34.3, 247.4*, -21.0, 7.7, -83.1*, 9.3, -53.8 (*p < .05). For incarceration, they were 17.9*, 7.0, -13.8, -11.5, 4.2, 5.6.
TABLE 2. Two-Stage Least-Squares Regression Results for Incarceration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td>PCSE</td>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td>PCSE</td>
<td>(\beta^*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime(_{t-1})</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment(_{t})</td>
<td>156.64**</td>
<td>36.73</td>
<td>159.29**</td>
<td>37.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty(_{t})</td>
<td>483.80**</td>
<td>94.51</td>
<td>491.63**</td>
<td>90.13</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue(_{t-1})</td>
<td>-4,071.37*</td>
<td>2,405.72</td>
<td>-4,259.44*</td>
<td>2,410.08</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income(_{t-1})</td>
<td>- .36</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic control(_{t-1})</td>
<td>-234.38*</td>
<td>124.49</td>
<td>-221.33*</td>
<td>126.59</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interparty competition(_{t-1})</td>
<td>-13.28*</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>-13.77**</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology(_{t-1})</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reapportionment(_{t})</td>
<td>- .27</td>
<td>26.49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class bias(_{t-3})</td>
<td>127.54</td>
<td>359.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military(_{t})</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency(_{t-2})</td>
<td>23.92**</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>24.31**</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency(_{t-3})</td>
<td>-16.03</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>-16.85</td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC(_{t})</td>
<td>- .06**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>- .06**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>642.34</td>
<td>427.57</td>
<td>621.35</td>
<td>426.48</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted (R^2)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Column entries are unstandardized slope estimates (\(\beta\)), PCSEs, and for model 2, standardized slope estimates (\(\beta^*\)). A joint F-test indicated that the inclusion of unit effects (i.e., state dummies) was necessary for both first- and second-stage regressions (results not reported). Diagnostic tests reveal an absence of serial correlation, which is reflected by the insignificance of the coefficient for a lagged dependent variable when included in the model (results not reported). All estimates were generated by RATS, Version 4.2, using a two-stage least-squares PCSE procedure written by Nathaniel Beck. Significance tests are two-tailed for insurgency, one-tailed for all other variables. *\(p < .05\), **\(p < .01\).

for the effect of insurgency on incarceration. In Table 2, we see that the positive effect of insurgency at a lag of two years is matched by a negative effect at a lag of three years. This temporal pattern across the two dimensions of response provides additional support for the social control model: The levels of social control increase in response to insurgency and then decline when disorder subsides.

Returning to the dynamics of the welfare response, since it was found that AFDC expansion is contingent upon electoral considerations represented by size of the black population, we might expect the extent of AFDC contraction to be conditional upon the electoral context as well. Based on the coefficient estimates in model 2 of Table 1, this appears to be the case to some degree. The dashed line in Figure 4 displays the predicted effect of insurgency at a lag of five years across the range of values for the black population. As we can see, the picture that emerges here is somewhat different from that for AFDC expansion with the two-year lag. At lower levels of black population, the AFDC rolls appear to contract somewhat after order is restored, which does not appear to be the case at higher population levels. It seems that black electoral strength helps protect concessions made during disorder from being lost over time.

Thus far, the results across the two dimensions of response provide strong support for the social control model. Further support would be gained if it were found that AFDC and incarceration are reciprocally related, indicating that the two policy dimensions at least partly serve the same function of social control. This hypothesis is supported in tables 1 and 2, where coefficient estimates for the effect of incarceration on AFDC and for the effect of AFDC on incarceration are both negative and significant.

The Cumulative Effect of Insurgency

In combination with the direct influence of insurgency and the conditional nature of both the long- and short-term effects, a welfare-incarceration tradeoff would suggest that the overall effect of insurgency may be quite complex. As the cumulative effect of insurgency is not easily discernible from tables 1 and 2, I present Figure 5, which displays predicted levels of AFDC recipient rates and incarceration rates for two hypothetical states. To generate these estimates, predicted values for changes in AFDC and incarceration were first calculated, holding the values of all exogenous noninsurgency variables constant at representative values, which allowed the total effect of insurgency (direct and indirect effects combined) to be isolated. These predicted change values (i.e., first differences) were then converted to levels for ease of interpretation.
FIGURE 4. Predicted Effect of Insurgency on AFDC Growth, by Percentage of State Population that Is Black, at Two-Year and Five-Year Lags (for States in which Electoral Access Has Been Achieved)

![Graph showing predicted effect of insurgency on AFDC growth](image)

and plotted in Figure 5. The hypothetical state in panel A experienced relatively little black violence (six incidents) during 1967–68, and black population size was rather small (3%). States that fit this description include Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Nebraska. In this case the initial response to insurgency is heavier reliance on beneficent control, but eventually both AFDC and incarceration return to levels close to those before unrest (holding other variables constant).

A much different picture emerges for the hypothetical state in panel B of Figure 5, where there was considerable black insurgency (23 incidents), and black population size was large (30%). In this category are most of the states in the Deep South. Due to the relatively strong expansive effect of insurgency on welfare generosity, coupled with the durability of this policy in the years following unrest, the long-term influence of insurgency is quite significant. There is a relatively permanent increase in AFDC levels, and the predicted tradeoff between social control strategies contributes to a relatively permanent decrease in the level of incarceration.

Figure 5 depicts two very different scenarios, and we are left to wonder whether and how these effects might have combined into a national picture over the same period. This can be seen in Figure 6, which plots observed AFDC recipients rates, incarceration rates, and levels of insurgency during 1962–80. There is evidence of the pronounced inverse relationship between AFDC and incarceration found in the state-level analyses presented above. In addition, the national trends resemble the pattern in Figure 5A more than the pattern in Figure 5B. This is not surprising, because the values of black population size and the level of violence used to calculate panel A are more typical across states than those used to generate panel B.

CONCLUSION

Although a relationship between mass unrest and welfare expansion has been established in several contexts, relatively little effort has been applied by social scientists to uncover the causal mechanisms. This research indicates that the social control perspective may provide the most valid explanation for this relationship in the case of black insurgency. Further work is necessary to determine whether these findings are applicable to other democratic systems, but this analysis may help explain important policy developments both past and present within the United States.

A widely debated historical question concerns the motivation behind New Deal legislation during the Great Depression, a period of unprecedented welfare state expansion to address the needs of the poor, the unemployed, labor, and the aged (e.g., Ametha, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Goldfield 1989; Piven and Cloward 1977; Quadango 1984; Skocpol 1980). A key

17 Predicted AFDC and incarceration changes were converted by assuming representative levels for the initial year of each series.
issue in this debate is the role of insurgency versus reform-minded politicians and parties in promoting reform. To the extent that the state functioned similarly during the 1930s and the 1960s, this research provides some support for the view that extrastitutional politics have been important in the development of the American welfare state.

This conclusion is not without qualification, however, as conventional electoral channels appear not only to condition the response to insurgency but also can contribute to reform independently. With respect to AFDC, this is evident by the direct influence of state ideology on welfare expansion (Table 1). For incarceration, the effects of party control and interparty competition also provide evidence of the importance of conventional politics in the area of criminal justice.
policy (Table 2). Even if Marxists are correct regarding the role of the state, one should not ignore the relevance of other political and social constraints on state behavior. This seems to be the conclusion reached by Ametha, Dunleavey, and Bernstein (1994) in their analysis of Huey Long's followers. Their political mediation theory suggests that evolution of the welfare state is due to, and often conditional upon, a number of traditional economic and conventional political factors, and unconventional politics is only one (albeit the strongest) determinant. The results of my research fit nicely with such an interpretation, as conventional political institutions appear to operate as important constraints on state behavior and sometimes have significant effects in and of themselves.

Perhaps of more interest to students of contemporary welfare policy is the extent to which these findings, and the social control perspective more generally, can explain welfare trends since 1980. It appears that many states were unsuccessful in reducing AFDC in the years immediately after unrest subsided. If the social control model is correct, however, labor market imperatives, coupled with a mobilization of the business community, eventually would motivate policymakers to reduce welfare generosity throughout the 1980s and 1990s. According to Piven and Cloward (1982, 13), this was an important motivation for President Reagan's attack on public assistance programs, as AFDC served to "limit profits by enlarging the bargaining power of workers with employers." This thesis is echoed by Noble (1997, 107) who maintains that "generous public assistance programs made it harder for employers to cut labor costs because they cushioned workers from the shock of unemployment." He concludes that the political mobilization of the American business community played an important role in the contraction of the welfare state over the last two decades, perhaps culminated by national legislation in 1996. On the surface these developments appear to represent merely an ideological swing to the right that began in the 1980s, but this research suggests that the continued effort by states to reduce AFDC might best be seen as part of the historical dynamic of welfare expansion and contraction first identified by Piven and Cloward in Regulating the Poor.

If this dynamic at least partly explains recent contraction of the welfare rolls, then this research may explain a second important policy trend in recent years. If a welfare-incarceration tradeoff exists, then efforts to reduce welfare throughout the 1980s and 1990s should have been matched by some increase in incarceration. This seems to correspond with what we know about the aggregated national level trends, but it is not necessarily the case at the state level. Some evidence is provided, however, by recent state-level analyses of AFDC caseload reductions and AFDC waiver adoptions (Fording 1998), and an analysis of state welfare reform provisions under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program (Soss et al. n.d.). Each of these studies reports that a decline in welfare generosity by states is related to an increase in incarceration levels. More research is needed to determine exactly why this relationship exists, but it appears that the utility of the social control perspective in explaining policymaking may extend beyond the period of black insurgency.
APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES

Insurgency: From Fording (1997, 11), defined as "any act of violence on behalf of blacks or minorities, either spontaneous or planned, which is either framed as, or can be construed as politically motivated." Data were originally obtained from several sources, including the New York Times; the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders; Riot Data Review, published by the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence; Facts on File; and Congressional Quarterly.

AFDC: Change in the number of AFDC recipients per one million population, for December of each year. These data are available from Social Security Bulletin, various years.

Incarceration: Change in the number of adults incarcerated per one million population. Data are published by the Department of Justice in Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31 and are reprinted in Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Per Capita State and Local Government Tax Revenue, Per Capita Income (1967 dollars): Measured as the first difference. Published yearly in Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Interparty Competition: A yearly measure was computed by averaging the majority vote for governor and the average majority percentage within the state legislature (% of majority in House/2 + % majority in Senate/2). This value was subtracted from 100 to yield a measure of competition that ranges from zero (no competition) to 50 (perfect competition). Interparty competition is measured as the change (first difference) in competition. All component variables are available from Statistical Abstract of the United States and the Book of the States.

Democratic Control of State Government: Measured as the change in Democratic control, so that state-years in which Democratic control replaces Republican or divided control receive a value of 1, state-years in which Republican or divided control replaces Democratic control receive a value of −1, and all other state-years receive a value of 0. Relevant data are available from Statistical Abstract of the United States and the Book of the States.

Crime: Change in the yearly crime rate (number of offenses per 100,000 population). Crime data are published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Uniform Crime Reports for the United States (reprinted in Statistical Abstract of the United States). Part I and II offenses are included.

Urbanization: Annual change in the percentage of state population that resides in metropolitan areas. Data were obtained for decennial years from the U.S. Census and for intervening years from the Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports (P-25).

Poverty Data: Annual change in the number of female-headed families below poverty per 1,000 population (AFDC model) and in the percentage of individuals below poverty (for incarceration). Available for 1959, 1969, 1975, and 1979 (intervening years interpolated) in State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1979, 1982, and Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Unemployment: Annual change in state unemployment rate (yearly average). State data were obtained for every year and are published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the President.

Class Bias: From Husted and Kenny (1997), measured as the annual change. This variable is constructed by (1) obtaining yearly income per capita for each state, (2) obtaining an alternative version of state income per capita by computing a weighted average of county-level income per capita, with weights based on turnout in the most recent federal election, and (3) calculating the final measures as the ratio of the turnout-adjusted measure created in step 2 to the statewide average published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Reapportionment: Modeled as an intervention; the value represents the magnitude of malapportionment (i.e., the extent of reapportionment (i.e., the extent of reapportionment) that existed before the properly apportioned system was implemented. This value is calculated as follows: (Maximum District Size - Minimum District Size)/(Average District Size). The measure is based on detailed accounts of state reapportionment efforts reported by the National Municipal League in Apportionment in the Nineteen Sixties and the Book of the States, published by the Council of State Governments.

Black Electoral Access (Power): From Fording (1997), a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 when two conditions are satisfied: (1) blacks have effective voting rights (based on implementation of the Voting Rights Act [VRA] of 1965 in certain states); and (2) districts are properly apportioned (for states in which more than 90% of blacks reside in urban areas); 0 otherwise. Data are from the National Municipal League, Apportionment in the Nineteen Sixties, and the Book of the States as well as targeting of VRA enforcement.


Medicaid: A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 in the first year a state implemented the Medicaid program, 0 otherwise. Implementation dates for the Medicaid program are reported in Table 7 of National Center for Social Statistics (NCSS) report B-5, Medicaid Statistics, FY 1971.


REFERENCES


